I examine if employment protection affects parental childcare. I find that a softer employment protection has a substantial effect on how parents use and divide paid childcare between them. The identification relies on a reform that made it easier for employers in Sweden to dismiss workers in small firms. I estimate that a softer employment protection reduces the total days of parental childcare in targeted firms, measured as total days of parental leave or temporary parental leave. Both a sorting effect and a behavioral effect can explain the reduced childcare. I also find evidence of a redistribution effect of paid parental childcare within households if only one partner was affected by the reform. I interpret the redistribution effect as a way of evading an external cost on the child.
Introduction
The dual earner family has become the most common family form in developed countries today. 1 Consequently, the importance of being able to combine work and family has increased. 2 In the European Union, reconciliation of work and family has been on the political agenda since the mid 1980´s and is today stated in the Lisbon Treaty. 3 More explicitly, family policies such as parental leave and subsidized childcare have been implemented to help parents juggle work and family. Economic research has
shown that fertility as well as the use of paid parental childcare can be affected by family policies. 4 But how non-family friendly labor market institutions influence working parents is less understood, though a good understanding of their effects ought to be fundamental for creating a successful reconciliation of work and family.
In this study, I examine the impact of employment protection on working parents' willingness to provide childcare. The level of employment protection is directly linked to the risk of being dismissed if an employee is absent and has been shown to affect workers' absence behavior. 5 Besides the insight that the use of sickness absence is affected, little is known of how employment protection affects other types of behavior.
To understand if employment protection influences parental childcare, I analyze an exemption in a seniority rule that made the employment protection softer in firms with two to ten employees in Sweden. The seniority rule is applied if a firm has shortage of work and specifies the dismissal order in accordance with workers' firm-specific tenure.
Starting in 2001, firms with two to ten employees can exempt two workers from the tenured-based dismissal order. Since the exemption only increases the number of workers at risk for being dismissed in small firms it creates within country variation in employment protection and thereby an opportunity to overcome the fact that a worker's 1 The dual earner family is the most common family form in a majority of the OECD countries (OECD (2010)). In 2007, the median employment rate for partnered mothers aged 15-64 was 66.5 percent in the OECD countries. For the U.S., the Current Population Study for 2008 shows that 57.3 percent of all married-couple families were dual earner families. 2 The Economist, Dec 30th 2009, "Female Power" writes: "Many women -and indeed many men -feel they are caught in an ever-tightening tangle of commitments. If the empowerment of women was one of the great changes of the past 50 years, dealing with its social consequences will be one of the great challenges of the next 50." 3 The legislation is stated in article 33 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon treaty. Since 2002, reconciliation of work and family is also one of three main objectives in the EU gender policy. 4 For instance, Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) provide evidence that job protected parental leave has a positive effect on fertility and mothers' time between birth and return to work. Skyt-Nielsen (2009) and Ekberg et al (2005) find that family policies can affect the within household distribution of parental leave by introducing economic incentives or by earmarking certain days to the father A reason for parents to be unwilling to provide childcare is that a career interruption can have a negative effect on subsequent earnings as discussed by Albrecht et al (1999) . 5 See Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001) , Ichino and Riphahn (2005) , Lindbeck et al (2006) , Olsson (2009) and Jacob (2010) . See also Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) for how worker effort in terms of unpaid overtime may vary with employment protection.
level of employment protection is not random. The reform of the seniority rule has been shown to decrease the sickness absence in small firms (Lindbeck et al (2006) and Olsson (2009) ) and increase hires and separations in small firms (von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010)). Notes: The figure uses a repeated cross-sectional sample where firm size is measured as the average yearly number of employees. "Treated" refers to firms with two to ten employees and "control" refers to firms with eleven to 20 employees.
This paper focuses on working parents and their use of paid childcare. In general, parenthood implies absence from work when caring for the child. To the extent that employers dislike absence periods, one can expect working parents, as a group, to be extra sensitive to softer employment protection. For instance, a softer protection can lead to dismissals of working parents if employers favor workers that are less absent, or working parents may seek jobs with a higher level of protection to avoid a dismissal. In Figure 1 , it is seen that the share of employees with young children drops by 1.4 percent on average (0.45 percentage points) in firms with two to ten employees in the periods following the reform in 2001. 6 Figure 1 indicates that working parents may be sensitive to softer employment protection. 6 The decline of 1.4 percent refers to the drop relative to the pre-reform average for the treatment group. To measure parental childcare, I use comprehensive data on paid parental leave and temporary parental leave (care of a sick child) combined with detailed individual information for the whole Swedish working population. The connection between employment protection and parental childcare is investigated with a difference-indifference strategy that compares childcare for workers in firms with two to ten employees with childcare for workers in firms with eleven to 50 employees, before and after the reform in 2001. I conduct a graphical analysis that shows that the groups have similar trends in key outcomes prior to the reform, which suggests that my results can be interpreted as causal.
I find that a softer employment protection reduces parental childcare. More specifically, I estimate that a softer employment protection reduces the total days of paid parental leave by on average 10.6 percent among workers in treated firms. The decline in total days of temporary parental leave is estimated to 5.5 percent. Two mechanisms can explain the decline: a sorting effect that changes the worker composition in targeted firms and a behavioral effect that changes working parents' willingness to provide childcare. Parents' relative employment protection seem important for the within family distribution of childcare. I estimate that in families where one partner got a softer employment protection, the use of parental childcare increased in general for the unaffected male partner in reaction to the softer protection for the other partner.
This study provides evidence that labor market institutions unrelated to family policies can be important for parents' willingness to provide paid childcare. While this seems obvious, it has attracted little attention so far. I present three novel findings. First, I estimate that a softer employment protection makes working parents less willing to provide paid childcare. This extends the literature on how employment protection affects workers' behavior where sickness absence has been assessed earlier (Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001) , Riphahn (2004, 2005) , Lindbeck et al (2006 ), Olsson (2009 ) and Jacob (2010 ). Second, I show that a softer employment protection in certain firms can offset a sorting effect that alters the composition of the workforce in targeted firms in such a way that average parental childcare among employees is decreased. This confirms that employment protection can affect groups of workers differently (Delacroix (2003) and Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) ). Third, I find empirical support for the fact that the intra-household distribution of childcare is partly based on parents' relative degree of employment protection which relates to the literature on how distributional factors can change the relative bargaining power within families (see Browning and Chiappori (1998) , Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) , and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) for how the distributional factor affects spouses' relative bargaining strength, and in particular Parys and Schwerhoff (2010) for how distributional factors can affect the within family distribution of parental leave).
Institutional setting
In this section, I briefly describe the Swedish employment protection legislation with a focus on the seniority rule and how it was reformed in 2001. I also describe the general outline of the Swedish parental insurance system.
The employment protection legislation and the reform
The Swedish employment protection legislation act, Lagen om anställningsskydd, was introduced in 1974 and regulates three areas: regular employment, temporary employment, and collective dismissals. A debated part of the legislation is the seniority rule that stipulates the tenured-based order of dismissal at times of redundancies. The rule is often referred to as the "last-in-first-out"-rule as it states, somewhat simplified, that the last worker that was hired should be the first worker to be dismissed. 7 The rule includes all workers apart from family members of the firm owner and those in managerial positions and is applied within job task-specific groups at a firm. 8 The seniority based dismissal order was introduced to reduce the risk for older workers to end up in permanent unemployment. 9 A critique against the seniority rule is that employers can become reluctant to hire "wild cards", such as young individuals and immigrants, since bad matches are hard to resolve. Proponents of the rule often emphasize that the rule is dispositive since collective-agreements allow departures from it. Whether the rule is strictly followed or not appears to be correlated with the number of employees in a firm: Calleman (1999) studies 30 Swedish workplaces in the years 1994 and 1995 to see how the seniority rule is applied and finds that it is only strictly followed in small workplaces where job tasks are similar (small in terms of the number of employees).
7 If two workers have the same tenure, the oldest worker is prioritized. 8 In Swedish, this is referred to as "turordningskretsar". 9 A tenured-based dismissal order implies that employers cannot sort employees according to their productivity, as pointed out by Edin and Holmlund (1993) . By having employees of different productivities share the unemployment risk, the signaling cost of unemployment becomes less costly since the signal contains less information about an employee's productivity.
The aim of the reform in 2001 was to alleviate the cost of the seniority rule for smaller firms because a key worker was considered to be relatively more important for the operation of smaller firms. An amendment was thus added to the Swedish employment protection legislation in January 2001 that allowed firms with at most ten employees to exempt two workers of significant importance from the stipulated order of dismissal. The amendment came about through an unexpected collaboration between the Green Party and the non-socialist parties and was decided in October 2000. Lindbeck et al (2006) present the chronological order of the decision process. During the early spring of 2000, the discussion concerned whether to allow exemptions in all firms or only in firms with at most ten employees. In May the same year, it became clear that the first alternative could never be implemented, and it was not until October 2000 that it was finally decided that only small firms were to exempt two workers from the seniority rule.
Already in 1994, firms of any size were allowed to exempt two workers from the stipulated order of dismissal, but the exemption was abolished one year later when the Social Democratic Party came into power with the argument that the exemption had given employers too much power in their relationship to employees as employers were already able to decide when to dismiss workers due to shortage of work.
When a firm can exempt two workers from the seniority rule it increases the number of workers at risk of being dismissed. Before the reform, the seniority rule stipulated that only the worker with shortest tenure in a firm was at risk of being dismissed if one worker were to be dismissed and the rule was strictly applied. But after the reform the worker with shortest tenure shares the risk with the two workers who have the second and third shortest tenure in the firm. For all of these workers the linkage between their productivity and continued employment became stronger. For the workers with second and third shortest tenure it get relative more important to signal a high effort or high productivity to remain employed and the worker with shortest tenure gets a greater a chance to remain employed at times of shortage of work as the least tenured worker can be exempted from the seniority rule based dismissal order. By signaling a high effort or productivity the worker with shortest tenure can affect the probability to remain employed.
If employers dislike workers who are absent, exempting two workers from the seniority rule can, in particular, trouble working parents. The reason is that parenthood often comes with an increase in absence when caring of the child and employers can use the exemption of the seniority rule to exempt workers in such a way that working parents are dismissed to a greater extent. 10 If parents feel that the use of paid parental childcare during working hours can have a negative effect on their future employment they may react by reducing their use of paid childcare.
Earlier studies show that the reform of the seniority rule had an impact on both workers and employers: Lindbeck et al (2006) and Olsson (2009) report that workers in eligible firms decreased their sickness absence once the reform was implemented and von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010) discover that the reform increased hires and separations in small firms by five percent each. Moreover, when the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise in 2009 made a survey of 600 firms with five to ten employees, 32 percent of the 174 firms that reported that they had had displacements during the previous year claimed that they had made use of the exemption.
The parental leave insurance
The Swedish parental insurance system dates back to 1974 and provides economic compensation for foregone labor income when taking care of a child during regular were unacceptable and involved in particular pregnant women, parents on parental leave and elderly workers (Arbetaren (2003) ). Earlier experience of reforming the seniority rule also suggests that working parents can be negatively affected. In 1999, the Swedish ombudsman of equality (JämO) assessed the firm size neutral exemption of two workers introduced for one year in 1994. One of the main conclusions is that the exemption in 1999 had had a disproportionally negative effect on workers on parental leave and older women. There have also been three parliamentary bills with the objective to abandon the 2001-reform, all of them arguing that this does, in particular, hit pregnant women and employees on parental leave. (2003)).
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Conceptual framework 3.1 The direct effect
Employment protection is often justified on the basis that it protects employees from income fluctuations. But employment protection comes with side effects. Theoretically, employment protection increases a firm's adjustment cost and thereby also the matching of employers and employees. With rigid wages, the adjustment cost leaves some unproductive employer-employee matches unresolved and hinders some productive 13 In 2002, an extra 30 days of leave were also added. 14 These figures do not consider unpaid leave. In a survey made by the Swedish National Insurance Board, (2004) the correlation between the number of days on parental leave and days with paid parental benefits was 0.34 for mothers and 0.65 for fathers. So a third of the days a mother spends on leave are compensated compared to around two-thirds for fathers. Comparing used days of paid leave between parents is likely to not reflect the actual division of parental leave. 15 The number of days is measured as net days so spells lasting 3/4, 1/2, 1/4, or 1/8 of a day are recalculated into whole day equivalents. employer-employee matches to occur. Hence, employment protection dampens job flows and worker flows on the labor market and can thereby affect the employment level (see, for example, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) , Pries and Rogerson (2005) ). Besides these outcomes, employment protection can affect productivity by distorting firms' choice of capital and labor in their production process (Wasmer (2006) and Autor et al (2007) ), by providing workers with incentives to accumulate firm-specific human capital (Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) ), and by influencing workers' absence behavior (Ichino and Riphahn (2005) , Lindbeck et al (2006) , Olsson (2009) and Jacob (2010)). 16 The reform of the seniority rule in 2001 reduced the adjustment cost for small firms.
I expect the lower adjustment cost to affect the use of childcare among workers in targeted firms in two ways: i) by sorting of workers that changes the composition of the workforce in small firms, and ii) by changing the behavior of existing workers. A negative sorting effect occurs if employers in small firms make use of the exemption to dismiss working parents that use more leave than the average worker at the firm. Also, workers in small firms who usually use paid childcare or intend to use paid childcare may move to employers not entitled to exempt workers from the seniority rule and thereby offsetting a negative sorting effect. 17 Whether this last type of sorting effect is relevant is unclear since changing employer means that a worker will be the last worker at the new workplace and therefore may face a higher risk of being dismissed in the short run. But if workers get tenured relative faster in the new firm, the relative dismissal risk compared to the risk in the old firm can decrease in the long run.
Moreover, when dismissals become easier, workers previously rejected on the basis of their current or expected future parental status can be employed (see Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) for a general discussion on employers' screening behavior and employment protection). Less careful screening may raise the average use of paid childcare among employees. The overall effect from sorting of workers is ambiguous: the sorting effect increases the average use of paid childcare if the effect from less rigorous screening dominates, and it is negative otherwise.
16 Lazear (1990) shows theoretically that inefficiency can be offset by specifying employment contracts to have an ex ante payment from the worker to the employer. 17 It could also be the case that workers who do not use paid parental leave or temporary parental leave move to small firms after the reform if they believe that the reform leads to higher wages or if they don't like to work with parents and they believe that the share of working parents will go down.
A softer employment protection makes a worker's productivity and continued employment more closely linked and can thereby affect the worker's absence behavior.
A lower protection means that an absence period is more likely to terminate an employment  a greater cost of an absence period. Costs associated with absence can vary with the job characteristics: if the job involves complementarities between coworkers, the absence of one worker affects other workers' productivity; unexpected absence can be extra costly when a substitute is hard to find at short notice. The type of absence sends different signals to employers, paid childcare can reveal how a worker values an employment relation relative to the family while sickness absence reveals information on an individual's health status. The signaling cost of absence may vary with social norms. Albrecht et al (1999) present empirical results that can be interpreted as if parental leave by fathers' signals a lack of career commitment while parental leave by mothers contains no such information. Bygren and Duvander (2006) find that workplace norms affect parents' use of parental leave, especially among fathers, and a key finding is that men at workplaces where men tend not to use parental leave are less likely to use parental leave themselves.
The indirect effect
In a collective family model, the intra-household distribution of parental childcare depends on parents' relative bargaining power (see, for instance, Blundell, Chiappori,
and Meghir (2005)). Distributional factors can change parents' relative bargaining power and are defined as factors that influence the decision process within a household without having an effect on parents' preferences or their joint consumption set (Browning and Chiappori (1998) I then add individual information on parental leave and temporary parental leave from the Swedish National Insurance Board. These data include start and end dates for all spells in Sweden during the given period. I measure parental leave and temporary parental leave in two ways: i) the yearly incidence defined as the probability of having at least one paid spell during a given year, and ii) the total days of paid leave for spells started in a given year. 19 Considering the reform as a distribution factor presupposes that the reform did not affect wages in small firms. (2004)). 21
Empirical strategy
In my empirical strategy, I utilize the exemption in the seniority rule introduced in 2001
to examine if employment protection influences working parents' provision of childcare. The reform created within country variation in the level of employment protection as it was targeted towards firms with two to ten employees. Thus, I can use a difference-in-difference estimator to examine if a softer employment protection affects parents' willingness to provide childcare. The regression version of the difference-indifference estimator has the following form:
where Y igt is the average outcome for individual i in group g at time t,  t represents time effects, X it includes individual covariates, D gt indicates whether a person belongs to the treatment group at time t, Post t takes the value of one for periods from 2001 and onwards, and zero otherwise. The difference-in-difference estimator is represented by the interaction term D gt Post t and δ captures the average treatment effect under the 20 The correlation between paid days of parental leave and the actual number of days on parental leave is stronger for fathers. The estimate of the reform effect on total days of parental leave might therefore be more biased for mothers (Swedish National Insurance Board (2004)). For temporary parental leave, there are no reasons for not drawing full benefits while caring for the sick child. 21 I find no evidence that the daddy month reform effect vary between small and large firms, i.e. with the level of employment protection. A potential explanation is that leave can be taken during vacation in order to not displease an employer. By doing that, a worker gets the same number of days off from work while receiving the unused vacation days in economic terms on top of the economic compensation from the parental leave insurance.
assumption that the trends in average childcare would have been the same in treated and control firms if the reform had not happened.
The treatment group consists of individuals employed in firms with two to ten employees and the control group consists of individuals employed in firms with eleven to 50 employees. 22 The upper limit of the control group is based on two arguments: i) the pre-reform trend for temporary parental leave and parental leave is similar in the control group and the treatment group, and (ii) when I use a balanced panel I implicitly assume that the reform had the same effect on the probability of staying in the panel for employees in the treatment and the control group. 23 compare the firm size distribution before and after the reform, see Figure A1 in Appendix. 25 The difference-in-difference estimator in equation (1) captures both a behavioral effect and a sorting effect. A sorting effect is interesting on its own but will bias the estimate of the behavioral effect. Separating the two effects is difficult, but with individual data and assuming that the effects are additive separable and that the treatment effect is constant, the behavioral effect is isolated by an instrumental variable approach, as done by Lindbeck et al (2006) . The sorting effect is then the difference between the total effect and the behavioral effect. Treatment status in the spring of 2000, a period when the reform had not yet become public information, is arguably a valid instrument for treatment status in later years. The instrument is correlated with 22 The treatment group is also referred to as small firms and the control group as large firms. 23 For the repeated cross-sectional sample, the difference-in-difference estimate for the probability of being in the sample the following year is insignificant (the estimate is 0.0009 with a standard error of 0.0007) when comparing the period before and after the reform. 24 The probability for a small firm to enter or exit from the market was not changed by the reform in 2001 (von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010)). 25 The overall results using firm aggregated data are similar to the results using individual data, see Table A1 in Appendix.
later treatment status but uncorrelated with later outcomes caused by the reform since an individual in the spring of 2000 did not know if the reform was to be implemented or not. 26 the focus is on small firms and is reflected in the low share of females. In the preperiod, the average age, the share of females and average childbearing are similar in the two groups, while the use of parental leave and temporary parental leave is higher in the control group. Comparing the pre-period and the post-period, the share of employees with small children and employees who are childbearing becomes relative smaller in the treatment group while the average age of an employee in the treatment group increases. 26 Recall that the reform was an outcome of an unexpected collaboration between the Green Party and the nonsocialist parties and was publicly discussed during the spring of 2000. The instrumental variable model will estimate a local average treatment effect. Treatment status in the spring of 2000 is arguably a valid instrument as the reform became public information in mid 2000 and that matching on the labor market is not instantaneous. 27 The sorting effect can be identified under the assumptions that the sorting and behavioral effects are additive separable and that the treatment effect is constant. In that case, the sorting effect is the difference between the overall effect and the behavioral effect. For each difference, a 95 percent confidence interval is presented. Treated refers to firms with two to ten employees and control refers to firms with eleven to 50 employees.
Results
The direct effect
A crude means comparison of parental leave and temporary parental leave in Table 1 provides a first indication that employment protection influences parental childcare. In the years following the softening of the employment protection, the average used days Table 1 suggest that the incidence of parental leave and temporary parental leave declines in reaction to a softer employment protection.
To quantify the reform effect, I use a difference-in-difference estimator. A comparison of pre-reform outcomes for the treatment group and the control group is the only way of evaluating the crucial assumption of a parallel trend in the absence of treatment for the difference-in-difference estimator (Card et al (2011) ). Similar trends in years prior to the reform tell that economic shocks have affected the groups similarly in the past, indicating that the control group can serve as the counterfactual trend for the treatment group also after the reform. Figure 3 Notes: "Incidence" refers to the probability of having at least one spell in a year. "Year Effects" refers to the yearly group difference relative to the group difference in 2000 and are displayed with 95 percent confidence intervals. "Treated" refers to firms with two to ten employees and "Control" refers to firms with eleven to 50 employees. Notes: "Incidence" refers to the probability of having at least one spell in a year. "Year Effects" refers to the yearly group difference relative the group difference in 2000. All differences are displayed with 95 percent confidence intervals. "Treated" refers to firms with two to ten employees and "control" refers to firms with eleven to 50 employees.
Difference-in-difference estimates for the reform effect on parental leave are displayed in represents a separate model. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Child age specific effects are used for children aged three to twelve years. Treatment status as of spring 2000 is used as an instrument for later treatment status for the intention-to-treat estimate (ITT) and the instrumental variable estimate (IV). Table 3 presents reform effects for temporary parental leave. Once more, I find that parental childcare decreases in small firms after the relaxation of the employment protection: an average worker in a small firm is estimated to be 0.47 percentage points less likely to have a case of temporary parental leave during a given year after the reform and the total days of temporary parental leave are estimated to decrease by 0.0462 days (a decline of 5.5 percent compared to the pretreatment average). When I control for age of the parent and of the child neither women nor men are estimated to decrease their use of temporary parental leave. The drop in temporary parental leave seems thereby driven by a sorting effect. But the behavioral effect is estimated to be negative suggesting that sorting cannot explain everything, at least for employees in small firms in the spring of 2000. 30 Table 3 Temporary parental leave -average reform effects
Incidence
Total days All Women Men All Women Men (1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) represents a separate model. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Child age specific effects are used for children aged three to twelve years. Treatment status as of spring 2000 is used as an instrument for later treatment status for the intention-to-treat estimate (ITT) and the instrumental variable estimate (IV).
5.2
The indirect effect Do parents redistribute leave within the family if one parent gets a lower employment protection? I try to answer this question by examining if childcare by spouses who 30 The overall results are robust when I run the model using group-year aggregated data to account for intra-class correlation, see Donald and Lang (2007) . Table 4 . 31 A redistribution of paid childcare occurs only when the main income provider is an indirectly affected man: the total days of temporary parental leave are estimated to increase by more than 17.4 percent (0.2163 days) among high income men and the probability of having at least one spell of temporary parental leave per year increase by 17.7 percent (4.37 percentage points). That indirectly treated men with a relative high income react to their partners' softer employment protection can be a sign of that a flexible job makes it easier to take temporary parental leave while still work partly at home and having a high income is associated with a more flexible job.
In couples where both partners are treated, reallocation of leave to an unaffected spouse is not possible. Still, a reallocation can be economically motivated if the expected cost from a higher unemployment risk differs between partners. Table 5 displays with the idea that high income men have more flexible jobs. All in all, I find some evidence that the distribution of parental childcare within the family depends on parents' relative employment protection. An interpretation is that parental childcare decisions are, at least to some extent, taken in collaboration within the family and are partially based on indirectly expected economic costs (as the reform only altered indirect expected costs from absence). The results also highlight that the dual earner family can function as a social safety net by reallocating parental childcare:
a negative reform effect on the child was partially absorbed by reallocating childcare from an affected parent to an unaffected parent.
Robustness and further analysis
If a firm wants to reduce its workforce with one worker, the share of eligible workers according to the seniority rule varies with firm size and was changed by the reform in 2001. In a firm with two employees, the least tenured worker had to be dismissed before the reform. After the reform the worker with shortest tenure can be exempted from the seniority rule so that the worker with longest tenure, that was safe before the reform, is dismissed. Consequently, the share of workers that came under risk of being dismissed in a firm with two workers is 50% and the share of workers that shared the risk is 50%.
All workers in firms with two and three employees were thereby affected by the reform.
In a firm with four employees the worker with longest tenure is directly unaffected by the reform if one worker is to be dismissed. In the given scenario, the share of workers with no risk of being dismissed increases with firm size, see Table 6 . Notes: Size refers to number of employees at a firm. All figures are based on the assumption of one job task-specific group per firm, one dismissal and that the seniority rule is strictly applied.
Because the share of workers that were directly affected by the softer employment protection decreases with firm size I expect the average effect to decrease with firm size. To test for firm size specific reform effects I estimate the following model
where Y ift is the outcome for individual i in firm f at time t,  t contains time effects and D ft indicates whether a person is employed in a firm of size f at time t or not. Post t takes the value of one for periods from 2001 and onwards, and zero otherwise. Note that firms with 21 to 50 employees serve as the benchmark in the model. Figure 5 displays difference-in-difference estimates for the incidence and total days of parental leave and temporary leave for employees in firms with two to 20 employees. All estimates refer to the overall effect. A relative drop in parental childcare is estimated in smaller firms within the treatment group. A significant relative reduction is estimated in firms with two to seven employees. 32 In firms with eight to ten employees the model fails to estimate an average reduction by paid parental childcare. Figure 5 Firm size specific difference-in-difference estimates for firms with two to 20 employees Notes: "Size" is to the number of employees in a firm. All models use individual data and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Firms with 21 to 50 employees serve as the benchmark. "Effect" refers to firm-specific effects and "Upper/Lower" refers to a 95 percent confidence interval.
Moreover, when a firm can exempt two workers from the seniority rule more workers are at risk of being dismissed in firms with two to ten employees. can be explained by the fact that the reform strengthened the link between an employee's productivity and continuation of the employment. Notes: Each estimate represents a separate model. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The changes in dismissal risk are based on a scenario where a firm with two to ten employees is to dismiss one employee and each firm represents one job-task specific dismissal group. The estimates for "Sharing dismissal risk" use 19,812 treated observations, the estimates for "Higher dismissal risk" 55,384 treated observations and the estimates for "Unchanged dismissal risk" use 159,613 treated observations. The relative change relates the effect to the pretreatment average.
The construction of the control group partly relies on a high firm size threshold (50 employees) to allow individuals to flow within the balanced sample, an important feature since the reform affected hires and separations. But how important is the choice of the upper limit of the control group for the validity of my results? Figure 6 presents separate reform effects for models where the upper firm size limit of the control group increases gradually in steps of five, from 15 to 50 employees. 33 None of the previously estimated reform effects are sensitive to the selection of the upper limit of the control group. 33 Individual data from a balanced panel data set are used for each estimate. Notes: Each estimate represents a separate model. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. All models control for childbearing in 2000, age, sex and child age specific effects (age three to eight for parental leave and age three to twelve for temporary parental leave). The model in column (1) uses treatment status in 1999 for future treatment status, the model in column (2) uses treatment status in 1998 for future treatment status and the model in column (3) uses treatment status in 1997 for future treatment status.
Conclusion
In this paper, I provide new evidence on how employment protection affects workers' absence behavior revealing that indirect economic incentives can have a substantial effect on how parents use and divide paid childcare between them. In Sweden, firms with at most ten employees were allowed to exempt two workers from the tenure based dismissal order in 2001. I compare paid parental childcare for workers in firms under and above the size threshold over time with the help of a difference-in-difference estimator. The results can be summarized as follows. The softer employment protection reduces the total days of paid parental leave among workers in small firms by 10.6 percent and the total days of temporary parental leave by 5.5 percent. A sorting effect and a behavioral effect can explain the reduction in childcare. The softer employment protection is also estimated to influence the distribution of paid childcare within some families: in families with one treated and one untreated parent, I estimate a general increase in childcare for the unaffected male partner. I interpret the reallocation of leave as if parents try to avoid an external effect on the child.
I conclude that the supply of childcare by working parents is influenced by the general employment protection legislation and that the division of parental childcare within families is partly based on indirect economic incentives.
